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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
FRANK BRGOCH and 
SEYMOUR ISAACS, 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants/Respondents, 
vs. 
RONALD ALLEN HARRY, an 
individual; PRIVATE LEDGER 
FINANCIAL SERVICES. INC.. LINSCO 
FINANCIAL SERVICES. INC.. 
LINSCO/PRIVATE LEDGER 
CORPORATION: and DOES 1-10 
Defendants/Appellees/Petitioners. 
RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs/Appellants/Respondents, Frank Brgoch and Seymour Isaacs, appealed the trial 
court's ruling granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. The only issues raised on 
appeal by Plaintiffs were whether the trial court's ruling, that Defendants/Appellees/Petitioners, 
Private Ledger Financial Services, Inc., Linsco Financial Services, Inc., and Linsco/Private 
Ledger Corporation (collectively referred to as "Private Ledger"), were not liable to Plaintiffs, 
violated the doctrine of apparent authority and whether disputed issues of material fact precluded 
summary judgment. Brief of Appellants at 2. 
After briefing and oral argument, this Court issued a Memorandum Decision (not for 
publication) on April 18, 1996. (Addendum A) In that decision the court held that the trial 
court's reasoning was incorrect. This Court stated that "The general rule is that a principal is 
liable for injuries resulting from the fraud of its agent, committed during the existence of the 
Case No. 950238-CA 
Priority No. 15 
agency and within the scope of the agent's actual or apparent authority." Brgoch v. Harry. Case 
No. 950238, slip op. at 1 (Utah Ct. App. filed April 18, 1996). This Court further held that 
whether an agency relationship exists and the scope of the agent's authority are questions of fact 
which should be determined by a jury in all but the clearest cases and that the fact that an agent 
commits an act which is criminal "does not automatically shield the principal from all 
responsibility vis-a-vis an innocent third party." Brgoch, slip op. at 2. Furthermore, when the 
law was applied to the facts of this case, this Court determined that the trial court's conclusion 
was incorrect and that questions of fact remained regarding the scope of the agency relationship 
between Harry and Private Ledger. l LL. 
Private Ledger filed a Petition for Rehearing and this Court has requested this response 
from Plaintiffs Brgoch and Isaacs. 
ARGUMENT 
The arguments contained in Private Ledger's Petition for Rehearing are somewhat 
difficult to discern because they frequently overlap. However, three things must be remembered 
about Private Ledger's petition. First, Private Ledger's arguments are frequently based on 
disputed issues of material fact and represent only the facts which are favorable to Private 
Ledger. Private Ledger's reliance on facts which support only its position is specifically 
contrary to the standard of review required of this Court in summary judgment cases. 
Furthermore, Private Ledger's reliance on disputed facts plainly ignores this Court's holding that 
the scope of the agency relationship and the perception of the third party concerning the agent's 
JThe court also determined that the judgment could not be sustained on alternative grounds urged by 
Private Ledger concerning the statute of limitations. Brgoch, slip op. at 2. Because Private Ledger failed 
to cross-appeal, that issue was not properly before this Court. Private Ledger apparently does not raise 
any issue concerning the statute of limitations in its Petition for Rehearing. 
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apparent authority are questions of fact which should be decided by a jury in all but the clearest 
cases. Slip op. at 2. Second, Private Ledger refers to a supposed variety of cases which it 
claims support its position. However, Private Ledger relies on only two of those cases in its 
Petition for Rehearing and those cases simply do not withstand close scrutiny. The cases cited 
by Private Ledger are either factually or legally distinguishable. Finally, Private Ledger, 
throughout the course of this appeal and continuing in its Petition for Rehearing, has steadfastly 
refused to address the primary case which controls the outcome of this case, Horrocks v. 
Westfalia Svstemat. 892 P.2d 14 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
POINT I 
THIS COURT DID NOT OVERLOOK OR MISAPPREHEND 
POINTS OF LAW AND FACT IN ITS DECISION. RATHER, 
PRIVATE LEDGER'S ASSERTIONS REST ON DISPUTED 
ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT. 
Private Ledger first asserts that this Court erroneously interpreted the facts and relied too 
much on a single statement made by the trial court in its decision in this case. In making this 
argument, Private Ledger first sets forth several facts which it represents as "uncontroverted." 
In fact, the facts are controverted. For example, Private Ledger claims that "It is undisputed 
that, for purposes of Private Ledger's records, . . . the transfer of plaintiffs' funds to bank 
accounts in their names at FNB in Kansas was entirely proper." Petition for Rehearing at 2-3. 
In fact, Private Ledger fails to disclose that the transfer was effectuated only because its agent, 
Defendant Harry, forged the Plaintiffs' signatures on the transfer documents. (R. 601-02, 606-
07) The issue of whether this forgery could have been spotted by comparison of the signatures 
on the transfer documents to Plaintiffs' actual signatures on file with Private Ledger has not yet 
been the subject of discovery in this case. Private Ledger now knows that the transfer was 
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effectuated only through its agent's fraud and its representation of the incomplete facts on this 
point can only be characterized as self-serving. At another point, Private Ledger states 
"Plaintiffs did not produce a single shred of evidence indicating that Private Ledger had any 
knowledge of, or involvement in, the Red River transactions." Petition for Rehearing at 3. This 
statement overlooks the larger issue of "selling away" and ignores evidence presented to the trial 
court by the Plaintiffs which indicated that Private Ledger was aware of the practice of "selling 
away" by its agents and did little to control the practice. Also, Private Ledger must remember 
this case has not yet been tried. (R. 618-19) These instances demonstrate that disputed issues 
of fact remain regarding virtually all of the issues in this case and that summary judgment should 
have been foreclosed, as this Court rightly held. 
Private Ledger next argues that this Court focused only on one statement in the trial 
judge's ruling as a basis for its decision. Petition for Rehearing at 3. Private Ledger claims that 
examination of the entire oral ruling of the trial court would place the judge's statement in a 
different context. This claim simply does not withstand scrutiny. 
In granting Private Ledger's Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court stated, 
The question I have is just how far can be reached when the defendant in 
this matter, Private Ledger, has gone to what I think is more than sufficient steps 
to ensure that activities by the registered agent were pursuant to their policies. 
. . . In essence, it appears that when a registered representative of a 
brokerage firm clearly violates the firm's policies and engages in unauthorized 
activities without the knowledge of Private Ledger in this matter, I just cannot see 
how liability can be imposed upon the principal, Private Ledger, in this matter. 
The fact that Mr. Harry was criminally convicted of defrauding Private 
Ledger crystallizes my opinion in that one cannot be an agent of the principal 
at the same time engaging in conduct which is criminally fraudulent. They are 
mutually exclusive actions and terms. 
(R. 847-48, emphasis added). The emphasized statements are the statements at issue which 
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Private Ledger now seeks to minimize. However, what Private Ledger does not reveal is that 
these same statements were also incorporated into the trial court's written order which stated: 
"The fact Mr. Harry was criminally convicted of defrauding Private Ledger crystallizes the 
court's opinion in that one cannot be an agent of the principal at the same time engaging in 
conduct which is criminally fraudulent as to Private Ledger. They are mutually exclusive 
actions and terms." (R. 821) In fact, this was the only reasoning included in the trial court's 
Order. (Addendum B) Despite Private Ledger's protestations to the contrary, the original 
quotation itself as well as the court's written order amply show that the trial court's focus was 
totally misplaced, was contrary to the weight of authority, as this Court correctly held, and 
simply ignored the doctrine of apparent authority. 
With respect to the trial court's statements, this Court stated "The trial court cited no 
authority in support of this proposition and we are aware of none. . . . simply because the agent 
commits an act that is criminal does not automatically shield the principal from all responsibility 
vis-a-vis an innocent third party." Slip op. at 1-2. This Court's opinion was correct on this 
issue. Horrocks, 892 P.2d at 16-17. 
Private Ledger then concludes this point in its argument with a rather strange assertion. 
It states "The following issues for review were presented on appeal [by Private Ledger] but 
overlooked in this Court's memo decision . . . ." Private Ledger then gives a "laundry list" of 
issues and factual statements with little or no supporting argument. Petition for Rehearing at 
5-6. However, as was correctly noted in Appellants' Reply Brief, most, if not all of these issues 
were not properly before this Court and, therefore, were properly disregarded by this Court 
because Private Ledger did not file a cross-appeal. Private Ledger failed to disclose in its brief 
as it does in its Petition for Rehearing that some of the issues presented were ruled upon by the 
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trial court in a manner adverse to Private Ledger. See Reply Brief of Appellants at 2-6, 12-14. 
When an issue is resolved by the trial court against a party, that party must raise the issue either 
on direct or cross appeal and may not wait until the briefing stage of an appeal to raise the issue. 
State v. South. 885 P.2d 795, 798 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Henrettv v. Manti City Corp.. 791 
P.2d 506, 511 (Utah 1990); American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom. 689 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah 1984). 
Because of the trial court's disposition of several of these issues and Private Ledger's failure to 
cross-appeal that disposition, many of the issues listed by Private Ledger in its Petition for 
Rehearing and its Brief to this Court were simply not properly before this Court and should not 
have been considered by the Court. 
POINT II 
CONTRARY TO PRIVATE LEDGER'S CLAIM, THIS 
COURT OVERLOOKED NOTHING WHEN IT HELD THAT 
THE EXISTENCE OF AN AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WAS 
A DISPUTED ISSUE OF FACT. 
In the next point in the Petition for Rehearing, Private Ledger claims that 
"uncontroverted evidence" supported its motion for summary judgment. This argument 
disregards the standard of review in summary judgment cases and overlooks evidence presented 
by the Plaintiffs.2 
This case was decided on summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate only 
when no issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as 
a matter of law. K&T. Inc. v. Koroulis. 888 P.2d 623, 626-27 (Utah 1994); Higgins v. Salt 
Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the 
2Because of space considerations, the "uncontroverted evidence" presented in Private Ledger's 
Petition for Rehearing cannot be reviewed in detail. However, as will be pointed out in the text, 
sufficient evidence was produced by the Plaintiffs which, according to the standard of review, must be 
accepted by this Court, to withstand the Private Ledger's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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appellate court must review the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment is sought. K&T, Inc., 888 P.2d 
at 624; Higgms, 855 P.2d at 233. Therefore, when Private Ledger presents only evidence 
favorable to it and ignores contradictory evidence, it neglects the standard of review and its 
evidence should be disregarded. 
Contrary to Private Ledger's claim that "Plaintiffs presented no evidence to show that 
they had in fact made their Red River investments in the belief that Harry was doing so as the 
authorized agent of Private Ledger," the following evidence which, according to the standard 
of review, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, was presented to the trial 
court. Ronald Allen Harry was a registered agent and branch manager of Defendant Private 
Ledger's Salt Lake City branch office from January 1988 until November 1989. Harry's 
business cards, stationery and title at the office held Harry out as the branch manager of Private 
Ledger in Salt Lake City. (R. 602, 607) Harry managed Plaintiffs' retirement portfolios while 
he worked as the branch manager at the Salt Lake City office of Private Ledger. (R. 600, 605) 
Both Plaintiffs stated in affidavits that Harry held himself out as manager of the Salt Lake City 
office and that their dealings with Harry occurred at the Salt Lake City office of Private Ledger. 
(R. 601-602, 606, 607) Both Brgoch and Isaacs affirmatively stated that they were never told 
that Harry was acting as any type of independent contractor and that they were only informed 
that Harry was the manager of the Private Ledger Salt Lake City branch. (R. 602, 607) 
Furthermore, Brgoch and Isaacs each received statements from Private Ledger noting that funds 
had been transferred from their account. Another broker in the Salt Lake City office, Cregg 
Cannon, provided an affidavit that stated that Cannon had raised the issue of selling outside 
limited partnerships to officials of Private Ledger on at least one occasion and that he was led 
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to believe that Private Ledger, while not officially sanctioning the conduct, would "look the 
other way" when such conduct occurred. (R. 618-19) Cannon specifically stated, "My 
impression was that they [Private Ledger] didn't care about such action and that the action went 
on from various representatives and that if, in fact, I sold private securities they didn't want to 
know or be informed about those sales." (R. 619) Cannon also stated that Private Ledger's 
supervision over its agents and offices was non-existent. (R. 619) Finally, when Private Ledger 
did become aware of Harry's unauthorized and criminal actions, it did not contact specific 
investors whose funds had been placed at risk by Harry and inform them immediately of the 
unauthorized transactions carried out by Harry. 
To Brgoch and Isaacs, Harry had been cloaked with authority by Private Ledger to 
conduct the trades at issue. In short, evidence presented to the trial court demonstrated, as this 
Court correctly held, that the precise scope of Harry's agency relationship with Private Ledger 
was an issue of fact which can only be discerned after more discovery and a trial in this matter. 
POINT III 
THE CASES CITED BY PRIVATE LEDGER DO NOT 
SUPPORT ITS POSITION ON THE ISSUE OF APPARENT 
AUTHORITY. 
In Point III of the petition, Private Ledger claims that "This court's analysis [on the issue 
of apparent authority] is clearly contrary to that of numerous cases . . . ." Petition for 
Rehearing at 9. Despite the reference to "numerous cases," Private Ledger's petition discusses 
only one case in this section. That case, FSC Securities Corp., v. McCormack, 630 So.2d 979 
(Miss. 1994), is easily distinguishable from this case. Private Ledger fails to disclose relevant 
facts which determine the outcome of that case that are not present here. 
First, Private Ledger does not reveal that FSC Securities was an appeal from a trial, not 
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from summary judgment as is this case. FSC Securities 630 So.2d at 980. Three days of 
evidence had been received by the trial court and a fully developed record was presented to the 
appellate court for review. In this case, no trial has been held. Additionally, Private Ledger 
does not state that a determinative factor in FSC Securities, on which the appellate court based 
its holding, was the fact that the plaintiffs had notice that the agent in that case was acting for 
himself rather than for defendant FSC Securities. 630 So.2d at 986. Indeed, the Mississippi 
Supreme Court cited ample evidence which supported that conclusion. For example, as opposed 
to this case, the agent in FSC Securities met with the plaintiffs at their home, not at a place of 
business. 630 So.2d at 982. Also contrary to the facts of this case, in FSC Securities the 
agent's stationery and business cards contained the names of both his own company and FSC 
Securities. IcL Finally, the plaintiffs in that case gave the agent checks made out to the agent's 
own company, not to defendant FSC Securities IcL 
All of the foregoing facts distinguish FSC Securities from this case. Here, Plaintiffs 
Brgoch and Isaacs only ever dealt with Harry at the Private Ledger office in Salt Lake City. 
When they needed to contact Harry, they contacted him at the Private Ledger office. Harry's 
business cards and letterhead announced Harry as the manager of the Private Ledger office in 
Salt Lake City. (R. 602, 607) Furthermore, Brgoch and Isaacs were never informed that Harry 
was acting on his own behalf or even that he could have acted on his own behalf. (R. 602, 607) 
For all appearances to Brgoch and Isaacs, Harry acted only on behalf of Private Ledger and 
under its control and authority. The record clearly demonstrates that the transfer of funds from 
Plaintiffs' Private Ledger accounts was reported to Plaintiffs on Private Ledger statement sheets. 
(R. 600, 605) These facts distinguish this case from FSC Securities. 
Finally, Private Ledger asserts that FSC Securities stands for the proposition that an 
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analysis of apparent authority should first determine "whether the principals knowingly and/or 
negligently permitted their agents to claim they were acting within the scope of their authority." 
Petition for Rehearing at 10. No Utah authority is cited in support of this proposition. Private 
Ledger does not reveal that this proposition is based on Arkansas law and is contrary to the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency which this Court follows.3 However, even if this Court adopts 
this interpretation of the law, issues of fact raised by the plaintiffs make this issue one to be 
determined by the trier of fact, not by this Court. 
Because this proposition is from Arkansas law (dating to a 1937 case, Central Surety and 
Ins. Corp. v. O. & S. Wholesale Co.. 101 SW 2d 167, 172 (Ark. 1937)), it does not consider 
the Restatement (Second) of Agency, which is followed by this Court. For example, §161 of 
the Restatement specifically states: 
Unauthorized acts of general agent 
A general agent for a disclosed or partially disclosed principal subjects his 
principal to liability for acts done on his accounts which usually accompany or 
are incidental to transactions which the agent is authorized to conduct if, although 
they are forbidden by the principal, the other party reasonably believes that the 
agent is authorized to do them and has no notice that he is not so authorized. 
Restatement (Second) of Agency §161 (1958). Comment d to this section, which concerns the 
powers of managers, has specific application to this case. That comment states: 
d. Powers of Managers. In accordance with the rules stated in this 
Section, a disclosed or partially disclosed principal who entrusts an agent with the 
management of a business is subject to liability to third persons with whom the 
agent enters into transactions usual in such business, although contrary to the 
3
 While the statement concerning the conduct of the principal does appear in FSC Securities, that 
statement is an interpretation of Arkansas law. When the statement appears in FSC Securities a federal 
case from the Western District of Arkansas, Barker v. FSC Securities Corp., 133 F.R.D. 548 (W.D. 
Ark. 1989), is given as the source of the proposition. Examination of Barker reveals that the proposition 
is derived from an Eighth Circuit case which clearly stated that it was interpreting Arkansas law. Barker, 
133 F.R.D. at 551, citing Wal-Mart Stores. Inc. v. Crist. 855 F.2d 1326, 1331 (8th Cir. 1988). 
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directions of the principal, unless the third person has notice of such directions. 
Restatement (Second) of Agency §161, comment d (1958). The plain intent of the Restatement 
is contrary to Private Ledger's claim that the conduct of the principal should be the initial focus 
of inquiry. In several sections the Restatement stands for the proposition that an agent can 
disregard specific instructions from a principal and still act to bind the principal. See, e.g.. 
Restatement §8, comment d; Restatement §262. Horrocks incorporates that position into Utah 
law. 
Finally, even if this Court adopts the FSC Securities proposition, unresolved factual 
issues preclude this Court from ruling as a matter of law that no agency relationship existed. 
The FSC Securities proposition states that an inquiry should occur as to "whether the principals 
knowingly and/or negligently permitted their agents to claim they were acting within the scope 
of their authority." (Emphasis added.) In this case, Plaintiffs' evidence indicated that Private 
Ledger was aware of the practice of "selling away" by its agents and did little to control the 
practice. (R. 618-19) Some testimony even indicated that Private Ledger, though aware of the 
problem, turned its back on the problem and chose to ignore the actions of its agents. (R. 619) 
These facts raise unresolved issues concerning Private Ledger's negligence in permitting its 
agents to engage in unauthorized conduct despite contrary written agreements. This reinforces 
this Court's holding that issues of material fact concerning the agency relationship in this case 
can only be resolved by the trier of fact. 
POINT IV 
THIS COURT CORRECTLY RELIED ON HORROCKS 
WHICH IS INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM THIS CASE. 
In the fourth and sixth points of the petition, Private Ledger makes a broad assertion that 
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this Court's reliance on Horrocks is misplaced because, Private Ledger claims, Horrocks is 
distinguishable.4 In fact, Private Ledger is unable to distinguish Horrocks. 
In Horrocks, which was not available to the trial court at the time of its ruling, an agent, 
unbeknownst to the third party/buyer and the principal/seller, left the area apparently "making 
off with the undelivered equipment [belonging to the buyer] and cash [belonging to the 
principal]." 892 P.2d at 15. This Court stated that the central issue in Horrocks was whether 
"[The principal] should bear the responsibility for the unauthorized, adverse acts of its agent." 
892 P.2d at 15. The principal argued that the agent was acting outside the scope of his 
authority, was acting in his own self-interests, and that his actions were adverse to the principal. 
Id. This is exactly the argument that Private Ledger has made here with respect to its agent. 
In Horrocks, this Court soundly rejected this argument. The court stated that basic 
agency law requires that a principal be bound by the acts of an agent clothed with apparent 
authority. 892 P.2d at 15. This Court stated that even when an agent's acts adversely impact 
its principal, the principal is still liable for the agent's actions as against an unknowing and 
innocent third party. Specifically, the court stated: 
The loss that results from [the agent's] misconduct must borne by the party who 
empowered [the agent] to commit the wrong. "Where a loss is to be suffered 
through the misconduct of an agent, it should be borne by those who put it in his 
4Private Ledger's argument on this point contains statements regarding facts which are misleading. 
Specifically, Private Ledger's petition states "Had plaintiffs presented sworn affidavits or depositions 
indicating that, for example, (1) they made their checks for the Red River investment out to Private 
Ledger, (2) those checks had been cashed by Private Ledger, (3) they executed investment forms provided 
by Private Ledger to make the Red River investment, and (4) that the Red River investment had appeared 
on the Private Ledger account statements, such evidence may have given rise to issues of fact precluding 
summary judgment." Petition for Rehearing at 12. Private Ledger knows that no checks for the Red 
River investment were issued by Plaintiffs in this case and that the only documents relating to the transfer 
of Plaintiffs' funds were those documents which were forged by defendant Harry and Harry had 
discretionary investment authority which Private Ledger claims is prohibited. 
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power to do the wrong" County of Macon Shores. 397 U.S. 272, 279, 24 L. Ed. 
889, 890 (1877); See also Vickers, 607 P.2d at 607; Harrison. 257 P. at 679-80. 
[The principal] placed [the agent] in the position to perpetrate a fraud. 
Consequently, [the principal] must bear the responsibility for [the agent's] 
misconduct. 
. . . Even when the agent is acting adversely to the principal's interest, the 
knowledge of the agent may still be imputed to the principal. 
892 P.2d at 16-17. In Horrocks this Court adopted the position that a principal who cloaks an 
agent with apparent authority must suffer the loss due to an agent's misconduct even when the 
agent's misconduct has harmed the principal itself. 
In Horrocks the court analyzed facts which led the plaintiff there to believe that the agent 
was acting within his authority when he committed fraudulent actions. 892 P.2d at 16. In this 
case also, the facts show that Plaintiffs perceived Defendant Harry to be cloaked with apparent 
authority by Private Ledger. To the plaintiffs, Defendant Harry had authority derived from his 
managerial position with Private Ledger to sell the securities at issue. For all appearances to 
Plaintiffs, Harry acted only on behalf of Private Ledger and under its control and authority. 
This Court correctly applied Horrocks when it held that the trial court erroneously 
concluded that Harry's criminal activities freed Private Ledger from any liability to Plaintiffs 
Brgoch and Isaacs. This Court, in all likelihood considering the conflicting evidence contained 
within the record, correctly ruled that the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment to 
Private Ledger and that questions remain concerning the agency relationship which could only 
be resolved by a trier of fact. 
POINT V 
OTHER CASES CITED BY PRIVATE LEDGER ARE 
EASILY DISTINGUISHABLE. 
In Point V of the petition, Private Ledger claims that this Court's decision ignores "at 
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least five separate decisions" to the contrary.5 The cases cited by Private Ledger are easily 
distinguishable from this case. 
The first case cited, but not discussed, by Private Ledger is Bates v. Shearson Lehman 
Bros. Inc.. 42 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 1994). That case is easily distinguishable on its facts. There 
the First Circuit expressly held that there was no evidence of any representation or conduct to 
suggest to the plaintiff that the agent had authority to act for the principal. The court stated that 
the agent, while working for the principal, never opened an account with the principal for the 
plaintiff. The agent always visited the plaintiff's home to procure money from her; she never 
went to an office. Checks issued by the plaintiff were never made payable to the principal but 
rather were always made payable to the agent's personal bank. Finally, the agent "never 
expressly told or otherwise represented to [plaintiff] that her funds would be invested with [the 
principal]." 42 F.3d at 82. Furthermore, the court stated that the principal had no way of 
knowing of the existence of the plaintiff because the agent never opened an account for the 
plaintiff. Id. Indeed, the facts of Bates seem to suggest that it is doubtful that the plaintiff even 
knew that the agent worked for the principal. In contrast, in this case, Plaintiffs Brgoch and 
Isaacs routinely visited Private Ledger's office when they sought to deal with Defendant Harry. 
Harry's business cards and letterhead announced that he was the manager for Private Ledger. 
Brgoch and Isaacs had an account with Private Ledger. Even the fraudulent transfer of funds 
appeared on a Private Ledger account statement. For all appearances to Brgoch and Isaacs, 
Harry acted only on behalf of Private Ledger and under its control and authority. Private 
Ledger's claim that this case is indistinguishable from Bates is insupportable. 
5Although Private Ledger's petition states that five decisions are involved, only two opinions from 
other courts, neither of which is binding on this Court, are cited or discussed in the petition. 
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Private Ledger also discusses Hauser v. FarrelL 14 F.3d 1338 (9th Cir. 1994), to support 
its argument. However, as Private Ledger reluctantly acknowledged in its Amended Brief of 
Appellees, a significant fact in Hauser distinguishes it from this case. In Hauser the plaintiff/ 
investors "did not . . . contradict the brokers' representations that they told the customer that 
the [investment] would not be through [the brokerage firm]." 14 F.3d at 1433. In other words, 
unlike this case where Defendant Harry never informed Brgoch and Isaacs that the investment 
was not sanctioned by Private Ledger nor did Private Ledger inform Brgoch and Isaacs that 
Harry was acting as an independent contractor, the defendants in Hauser were specifically 
informed that the defendant brokerage firm did not sanction the investment at issue in that case. 
Examination of the cases cited by Private Ledger provides ample basis to distinguish 
them from this case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Private Ledger's Petition for Rehearing should be denied. In 
the alternative, should the court grant the petition, additional briefing should be permitted in 
those areas in which the court has concerns. 
DATED this 6th day of June, 1996. 
NYGAARD, C O ^ & ^ I ^ C E N T 
RANDY B. COKE 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants/Respondents 
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m 1 V 1996 
Frank Brgoch and Seymour 
Isaacs, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Ronald Allen Harry, an 
individual; Private Ledger 
Financial Services, Inc.; 
Linsco Financial Services, 
Inc.; Linsco/Private Ledger 
Corporation; and Does 1 to 10, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 950238-CA 
F I L E D 
( A p r i l 1 8 , 1996 ) 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Attorneys Randy B. Coke and Curtis C. Nesset, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellants 
S. Baird Morgan, Salt Lake City, Michael L. Kirby and 
Jeffrey P. Lendrum, San Diego, California, for 
Appellees 
J. Michael Coombs, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Ronald Harry 
Before Judges Orme, Jackson, and Wilkins. 
ORME, Presiding Judge: 
The trial court granted defendants' summary judgment motion, 
concluding that Private Ledger was not liable, as a matter of 
law, for the acts or omissions of defendant Harry. In its order 
denying plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, the trial court 
explained that "one cannot be an agent of the principal at the 
same time engaging in conduct which is criminally fraudulent as 
to Private Ledger." However, the trial court cited no authority 
in support of this proposition and we are aware of none. Nor 
have defendants called our attention to any such authority. 
Rather, the general rule is that a principal is liable for 
injuries resulting from the fraud of its agent, committed during 
the existence of the agency and within the scope of the agent's 
actual or apparent authority. See Restatement (Second) of Agency 
§ 161 (1958); Horrocks v. Westfalia Systemat, 892 P.2d 14, 15-16 
(Utah App. 1995); Poulsen v. Treasure State Indus.. Inc.. 626 
P.2d 822, 829 (Mont. 1981). Moreover, whether an agency 
relationship exists and the scope of the agent's authority are 
questions of fact to be determined by a jury in all but the 
clearest cases. C^rrUl, Inc. v. Mountain Cement Co.. 891 P.2d 
57, 62 (Wyo. 1995); Mauch v. Kisslina. 783 P.2d 601, 605 (Wash. 
App. 198 9) . Simply because the agent commits an act that is 
criminal does not automatically shield the principal from all 
responsibility vis-a-vis an innocent third party. 
In this case, the trial court's reasoning that "one cannot 
be an agent of the principal at the same time engaging in conduct 
which is criminally fraudulent," is simply not a correct 
statement of the law. Questions of fact remain as to the 
existence of the agency relationship between Harry and defendants 
and the scope of Harry's authority. 
Nor are we able to sustain the judgment on the alternative 
ground urged by defendants before the trial court, namely that 
plaintiffs' claims are barred by the statute of limitations. 
While traditional application of the discovery rule might suggest 
the claims are time-barred given plaintiffs' concession that they 
knew of some wrongdoing immediately upon receipt of the first 
statement sent by the Bank of Onaga, the result is otnerwise 
given the contention that Harry fraudulently concealed his 
misdeeds. See Berenda v. Langford. 237 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 
1996). See also State v. Harry, 873 P.2d 1149, 1156 (Utah App. 
1994) (noting that "Harry deceived [plaintiffs] both before and 
after the transaction" in question). 
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of defendants and remand the case for a trial 
on the merits or such other proceedings as may now be 
appropriate. 
Gregory B^urrae7 
Presidrrig Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
tforman H. Jacl^on, Judge 
Michael J. Wilkins, Judge 
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Attorneys for Defendants 
PRIVATE LEDGER FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., 
LINSCO FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., and 
LINSCO/PRIVATE LEDGER CORPORATION 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK BRGOCH and SEYMOUR ] 
ISAACS, ] 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RONALD ALLEN HARRY, an 
individual; PRIVATE LEDGER 
FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.; ] 
LINSCO FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.,; 
LINSCO/PRIVATE LEDGER CORPORA- ] 
TION; and DOES 1 to 10, 
Defendants. ; 
i ORDER 
i Civil No. C92-1463 
! Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
The motion of Defendants, Private Ledger Financial Services, 
Inc., Linsco Financial Services, Inc. and Linsco/Private Ledger 
Corporation for summary judgment, having come before the above-
entitled Court, the Honorable Glenn Iwasaki, District Court Judge, 
^M-
000820 
presiding and Plaintiffs Frank Brgoch and Seymour Isaacs 
represented by Randy B. Coke of Nygaard, Coke & Vincent, 
Defendants-movants being represented by S. Baird Morgan of Strong 
& Hanni and Michael L. Kirby of Post, Kirby, Noonan & Sweat, and 
attorney John Michael Coombs being present on behalf of Defendant, 
Ronald Allen Harry and the Court having received and reviewed the 
memoranda, affidavits and other document of record and being 
otherwise fully advised in the premises, now enters its Order as 
follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED AND ADJUDGED that the motion of 
Defendants, Private Ledger Financial Services Inc., Linsco 
Financial Services, inc., and Linsco/Private Ledger Corporation, 
based on the statute of limitations, is denied on the grounds that 
the Court finds a question of fact to exist as to possible 
concealment of Plaintiff's claims by Defendant, Ronald Harry. The 
motion of said Defendants for summary judgment on the grounds that 
said Defendants are not liable, as a matter of law, for the acts or 
omissions of Defendant Ronald Allen Harry is granted, dismissing 
with prejudice and on the merits all claims of Plaintiffs against 
Defendants. The fact Mr. Harry was criminally convicted of 
defrauding Private Ledger crystallizes the Court's opinion in that 
one cannot be an agent of the principal at the same time engaging 
in conduct which is criminally fraudulent as to Private Ledger. 
They are mutually exclusive actions and terms. The Court further 
2 
G O O 
finds pursuant to its ruling of May 17, 1994, the transcript of 
which is incorporated herein. 
day of DATED this 
APPROVAL 
, 1994. 
Glenn K. Iwasaki, District Judge 
Randy B. Coke 
Attoi^ey for Plairnt^ P\s 
JOKI Michael Coon 
Atforney for Defendant Ronald 
Tllen Harry 
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